Abstract-The worldwide communications resources of the Defense Communications System (DCS) are controlled by a multilevel control complex, with distribution of control functions among many control , facilities. The control structure is going through substantial changes, driven by considerations of reliability, survivability, crisis management capability, and of course, cost. This paper introduces the control structure, the ongoing and programmed improvements for the control capabilities, and how the Automated Technical Control (ATEC) equipments will form the basis of a distributed, processor based communications control utility. Finally, the unique features of the Real Time Adaptive Control System (RTACS) for the third generation Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) will be described, along with the integration of RTACS into the distributed global control structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper has been prepared to meet four objectives: to describe the present worldwide control complex which supports, manages, and controls the Defense Communications System (DCS) of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD); to describe an incremental improvement program for materially improving the control system; to show how the Automated Technical Control (ATEC) low rate production equipment will interface and assist in the implementation of various improvements to the DCS system control; and to illustrate how control for one major subsystem of the DCS, the Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS), is being implemented.
The control system of the contemporary DCS is based upon a five-level control hierarchy consisting of a Worldwide Control and Operations Center, two theater level control centers, and numerous sector, nodal, and station level control centers and facilities [l] . The worldwide and theater level control centers are managed and operated by the Defense Communications Agency as a joint activity of DoD, while the levels at sector and below are primdrily manned and controlled by the various military services. The upper levels of the hierarchy are automated, while lower levels of the hierarchy depend upon the internal. control features of the various DCS subsystems, and upon highly manual, labor-intensive procedures.
Substantial improvements in the system control capabilities for the DCS are proceeding in order to meet the broad objectives of improving the performance of the communications system and to improve the utilization of the manpower resources which are currently allocated to the control and management functions of the DCS. Improvements in system performahce will result from the application of increased automa- tion to improve management visibility of system strengths and weaknesses and the ability to access and manipulate the worldwi&database in a more timely fashion than currently possible. Ipjjioved manpower utilization will .result from increased operational efficiencies within the Defense Communications Operational Control Complex (DOCC) through automation, improved data collection and data availability, and better standardization of reporting data content and format within the various operating authorities and the Military Department o&M activities. Within the O&M activities, substantial manpower efficiency improvements are expected from automation of the routine quality assurance measurements, as well as reduced time required for fault detection and isolation.
Substantial automation of the station level quality assurance and performance monitoring functions will be achieved using ATEC equipment which began low-rate initial production in August 1978. The ATEC equipments will provide automation support to the sector, node, and station levels of the control hierarchy for the purposes of performance assessment and status monitoring of equipment and facilities, while sector and nodal processors will provide for computer-assisted transmission, traffic and network control functions, and other technical control functions as required.
A Real-Time Adaptive Control (RTAC) system is being developed for the DSCS to exploit the inherent flexibility of satellite communications (particularly in a crisis management scenario) and to increase the capacity and service provided by spacecraft and earth terminal equipments. Because access to communications satellites spans theaters, network (access) control and spacecraft control functions are provided by RTAC elements associated with the worldwide and theater level control centers. Control functions required at the earth terminals are accomplished by RTAC elements associated with the nodal and station control levels.
The DCS system control program evolves from years of research and development in the areas of automation of communications data acquisition, control, and management functions. It illustrates control procedures and techniques which are likely to be applicable to other complex, diversified communications systems which cover broad geographic areas. However, many procedural and operational constraints which exist in the military communications environment place an even greater burden on the control and management system than that traditionally found in civil and commercial systems.
THE CONTROL CHALLENGE IN A GLOhAL DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT
The necessity of communications in support of military operations has driven the development of many unique and pioneering technological improvements. It has also i d b i t k d U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright the standardization of communications resources, techniques, and facilities to the degree necessary to ensure the efficient and rapid establishment of communications connectivity on a global basis.. The irritating and frustrating part of this problem is that wherever there are elements of the United States or AUied fighting forces,'there is assuredly communications capability available. However, too often the user and the communicator lack the knowledge, capability, or interface equipments needed to achieve the tandem connection of unlike systems to achieve the needed communication path.
Assume, for the moment, that in response to a crisis, U.S. ground troops have been moved into a distant European area, significantly away from existing DCS fixed plant interconnect. Wanting an on the scene report, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs requests a high quality secure voice circuit to the commander in the field. A possible connectivity picture is shown in Fig. 1 .
Recognizing the complexity of this critical circuit, control is the all important element which can directly affect the success or -failure of the ability to communicate. The control points along the circuit have to cooperatively recognize the availability of ,capacity and assign the capacity and connectivity to this mission. They have to direct and supervise the physical connection of the circuit, whether by switch superSision or manual patching actions. Control facilities have to monitor the performance of the circuit. to ensure user satisfaction, and finally system control has to control traffic flow to ensure that maximum throughput is achieved on this scarce resource. Whether dealing with large switched networks or single critical circuits, system control deals with the establishment, monitoring, traffic, and technical control of communications resources. The challenge ,of control is to deal with a global resource, under a rapidly time-varying demand, and perform an efficient, operationally responsive (although not necessarily fair) allocation of resources.
In the interest of brevity, it should be recognized that the worldwide DCS is an extremely far-flung and complex communication system, providing capabilities and features not normally found in other private or public communications networks. This paper will not touch upon the details of the Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON), Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), Automatic. Secure Voice Network (AUTOSEVOCOM), and the large variety of media, ranging from high frequency radio to satellites which provide communications connectivity. However, it is important to note that these subsystems are going through a-rapid evolution to more modern digital capabilities, with improved reliability, better intrinsic control and monitoring capabilities, and the ability to be more responsible to the critical users which the DCS primarily serves.
The control of the DCS is broadly categorized into four functions: network control, traffic control, performance assessment and monitoring, and technical control and patch and test. Network control is responsible for putting the communications networks in place, including configuration control and planning and control of reconstitution, restoral, and extension of the DCS networks and circuits. Traffic control is needed to make effective use of the network, providing for traffic flow accomodation and routing control. Performance assessment and monitoring is required to evaluate the networks as complete entities, including provision of real-time status, performance trends, and management threshold controls, as well as providing data for engineering and design functions. The technical control, patch, and test function is the control activity ROSNER: CONTROL STRUCTURE FOR GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS 1507 which keeps the networks and circuits operating properly, including the quality assurance function. It is the actual implementor of authorized control and restoral actions. Control and management of the DCS shares many techniques and problems in common with the control and mapagement of commercial carrier networks. However, there are aspects of the problem which because of various factors make these functions, as performed in the DCS, highly unique. This uniqueness, of course, stems from the military uncertainties alluded to by the hypothetical circuit in Fig. 1 . These uncertainties arise from unpredictable geopolitical circumstances as well as a wide range of technical and resource management problems.
Foremost in this area of uniqueness is the fact that the Defense Communications Agency and its control and management centers perform many of the basic functions as do parallel organizations in commercial carriers. However, the system being managed is seen by DCA and the Department of Defense as a revenue consumer, as opposed to a commercial carrier network which is a revenue producer. As a consequence, widely accepted measures of performance for commercial networks (such as maximization of traffic flow) are not universally applicable to the DCS. Availability of resources is always severely constrained and limited, and growth of user demand cannot simply be met by expansion of plant. It is, therefore, imperative for the DCS to be managed to an individual channel and circuit level, with specific attention to a level of detail commensurate with single users. On the one hand, this appears to be a massive, global "bean-counting'' exercise, but it is, in reality, prudent management of a vital, but generally scarce resource. It must be simultaneously recognized that, in general, procurement of communications facilities fair poorly in competition with weapons systems in dividing up the defense budget. Naturally, this further constrains rapid expansion of communications plant.
Communications control and management for the DCS deals with an extremely wide ranging mix of resources. Equipment,. developed and acquired through the competitive bidding process, has a long lifetime in military inventory, yet often does not or cannot have the upward compatibility often seen in commercial communications. Systems and subsystems developed by differing contractors, to widely differing requirements, in different time frames, and to different states-of-theart, lead to a highly heterogeneous system. Even fundamental constants of communications technology as viewed in commercial practice (such as the 4 kHz voice channel) fail to exist in the DCS. For example, existing secure voice assets use a compendium of qualities and bit rates, from 2400 bits/s or less to 50 000 bits/s or more.
Detailed visibility and control, which by necessity are performed to the user and circuit level, have to be done against a constantly moving requirement set. Meeting total demand within the limited resource is accomplished by application of a wide ranging priority and precedence structure within the DCS. Individual users assign precedence on a call-by-call basis (up to some maximum allowable level) and individual circuits have wide ranging priorities, both for implementation as well as for restoral in case of failure or disruption. However, that very structure is itself highly dynamic in that a Second Lieutenant with only routine traffic authorization today may, as a consequence of a rapidly escalating crisis, have the nation's highest priority requirement tomorrow.
As a result of these unique considerations, flexibility and adaptability must be keystones of the control and management structure for the DCS. Borrowing from the experiences and successes of the commercial world gives DCS control planners and engineers a viable starting point, but these issues to a great extent lead to unique solutions.
THE PRESENT DCS CONTROL SYSTEM
The control system of the contemporary DCS is based upon a five-level control hierarchy pictured in Fig. 2 , consisting of a Worldwide Control and Operations Center, two theater level control centers, and numerous sector, nodal, and station level control centers and facilities. The worldwide and theater level control centers are managed and operated by the Defense Communications Agency as a joint activity of DoD, while the levels at sector and below are primarily manned and controlled by the various military services. The upper levels of the hierarchy, known as the Defense Communications Operational Control Complex (DOCC) is automated using a World Wide On-Line System (WWOLS) (Fig. 3) . The WWOLS, connected via the AUTODIN network, primarily uses IBM System 4331 computers and the Total Data Base Management System. The 4331 computers are connected in an arrangement forming a Distributed Processing System (DPS). Each site of the WWOLS-DPS uses a complex of between three and eight of the minicomputer mainframes, with shared peripherals to provide ADP support to each of the DCS operations centers.
The lower levels of the hierarchy presently depend upon the internal control features of the various DCS subsystems and upon highly manual, labor-intensive procedures. However, substantial automation of the station level quality assurance and performance monitoring functions will be achieved using Automated Technical Control (ATEC) equipment, which began low rate initial production in August 1978. The ATEC equipments will provide automation support to the sector, node, and station levels of the control hierarchy for the purposes of performance assessment and status monitoring of equipment and facilities, while sector and nodal processors will provide for computer assisted transmission, traffic and network control functions, and other technical control func-
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tions as required. An overview block diagram of the ATEC system is shown in Fig. 4 . Present operational control procedures for the DCS place primary responsibility for network and traffic control on the two theater level control centers, one each in Europe and Hawaii. Network control, involving both configuration control as well as reconstitution, restoral, and extension functions, utilizes a combination of computer-assisted techniques for circuit and route planning and manual controller positions to administer real-time responses to restoral, reconstitution, and extension requirements. Traffic control, which involves traffic flow accommodation and routing of traffic, varies according to the distinct capabilities of each of the subsystems. By and large, however, human intervention and manual commands are required to implement preplanned reroute and alternate routing plans for the various switched networks of the DCS.
The technical control functions which include quality assurance and testing and the implementation and supervision of control actions keep the networks operating as designed. AU circuits are tested on a routine, preventive maintenance basis, and user observations of circuit and system faults are used to initiate fault isolation and repair performance degradations which escape routine detection.
The hierarchical arrangement of the DCS control structure as depicted in The hierarchical control structure represents a compromise between system visibility, span of control, and delegation of management and control authority between the Defense Communications Agency and the military department operations commands which actually operate and maintain the communications facilities. While the flow of control information and command authority follow this hierarchical pattern, the actual physical arrangements of the networks and control facilities is of a distributed nature. Fig. 5 shows a representation of that physical relationship, illustrating the many redundant paths and alternative connections among the control elements.
IV. ATEC-MORE THAN A TECH CONTROL
The ability to adapt the performance measurement equipment acquired under the ATEC program to broader system management functions required the judicious compromise of system design capacity and flexibility against the ultimate master of cost. By capitalizing upon the rapidly increasing power of recent vintage minicomputer-based systems, together with the careful choice of a fully upward compatible family of equipments, these objectives can, at least partially, be met. The design utilizes the DEC PDP-11 series of minicomputers. Referring to Fig. 4 , the sectors and nodes are essentially identical configurations of PDP 1 1 /70 mainframes, with 5 12 kbyte of main memory and 134 Mbyte of disk storage. Each element of the Measurement Acquisition System (MAS) utilizes a PDP-LSI 11/2 as its main control element. Design of processor and communications loading has been maintained at about 50 percent of capacity, and main storage occupancy to about 75 percent of capacity to permit the overlay of system management software and processing in addition to the detailed technical control monitoring, assessment, and fault isolation functions. As a result, substantive improvements in the system control capabilities for the DCS are proceeding in order to meet the broad objectives of improving the performance of the communications system and to improve the utilization of the manpower resources which are currently allocated to the control and management functions of the DCS. The net effect is to make the DCS a more responsive and survivable system operating under stress, crisis, or wartime conditions. In addition to these broad objectives, the deployment of new capabilities, including AUTODIN I1 (a packet-switched data communications network), an Improved Secure Voice Network, and Phase I11 of the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) will all tend to increase the load on the controllers at the Worldwide and theater level control centers. On the other hand, experience with digital terrestrial transmission equipment has pointed toward increased reliability and decreased work load on technical controllers at the station level wherever digital PCM/TDM equipment is deployed as replacement for analog transmission facilities.
Updating of the overall control complex and operational procedures are thus required to ensure that the structure fully capitalizes on these substantial changes in the communications facilities. Maximum utilization will be made of the inherent capabilities of these new subsystems to provide both performance and status information as well as their ability to respond to control directives emanating from manual and automated sources. Achievement of these objectives will depend upon improved system control automation, integration, and information flow among the various levels of the control hierarchy. Along with the automation of the sector level using ATEC equipments, additional control reliability and survivability will be achieved. Improvements in database management and performance data correlation will enhance system management overview and minimize customer outages.
V. INCREASED RESPONSIVENESS AND SURVIVABILITY THROUGH AUTOMATION AND INFORMATION FLOW IMPROVEMENTS
A needed step in the overall improvement of the control structure of the DCS, is the application of a greater degree of automation and integration to the flow of system related information up and down the control hierarchy. Fig. 6 shows a matrix relationship between the four primary system control functions and the five levels of the physical control hierarchy.
The entries in the matrix, together with their associated "arrows" depicting the span of improvements, indicate the focal points of near-term efforts to achieve these needed information flow improvements. Mechanistically, the ATEC equipment will provide the vehicle for this information flow improvement by virtue of its processing and data communications capabilities applied to the sector and nodal levels of the hierarchy. At the upper two levels of the hierarchy, the desired results will be achieved through direct computer-to-computer interface of the WWOLS to the ATEC sector processors, in conjunction with additional applications software packages to capitalize on the availability of more accurate and timely data from the ATEC equipment.
Associated with the integration and automation of the status and control information flow is the upgrading of the database management function for the World-Wide On-Line System. As ATEC assets are deployed, a machine-to-machine interface across the ATEC-WWOLS boundary must be ensured. This is needed to make timely database information available at all levels. The common elements of the database will be used to more effectively manage the Traffic Service Request/Traffic Service Order (TSR/TSO) process for circuit assignment and deployment. In addition, contingency restoral management will be accomplished by initiating a temporary database conforming to the permanent database structure. These actions will be based on lowest level reconnectivity action by the technical controllers.
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Another impact of the automation and integration of control and performance data will be the ability to use systemwide correlation to detect and isolate failures or to detect adverse performance trends before they result in system failures or outages. Correlation functions can be achieved by a combination of applications software modules primarily applied at the theater and sector levels of the hierarchy. Correlation algorithms can be applied using data collected as part of normal monitoring and management functions. The primary use of such capabilities would be to resolve interface problems, detect transmission degradations, and to identify failures as being. either switch or transmission related. Trend analysis may be used to forecast outages, and more importantly to schedule preventive maintenance. The automation of the sector level of the system control hierarchy provides an opportunity to substantially increase the overall redundancy and survivability of DCS System Control. By essentially replicating the theater database at each sector, and by placing emphasis on communications connectivity and throughput (rather than quality assurance and performance monitoring), each sector is capable of temporarily absorbing the real-time communications control for the various DCS subsystems in case of failure of the Area Communications Operations Center (ACOC). With emphasis on the critical functions at the sectors, the longer term management functions, such as quality control, and circuit order development can be elevated to the DCA Operations Center for theater level backup. Once the ACOC resumes operation, control can be rapidly transferred back by reconstruction of the database from the surviving sector or sectors, together with new circuit information provided by the temporary circuit allocator.
. The ability for a sector level facility to absorb the real-time control and management functions has been demonstrated by various contingency planning exercises involving the existing DCS. The sector level automation to be derived through the ATEC equipment will add sufficiently to the level of capability so that the sectors will each be able to absorb these contingency roles. A particularly beneficial aspect of this form of backup to the ACOC functions is that by operating with the inherent capabilities of the sector level equipment, any one of three or fout sectors per theater could operate in the restoral role. In addition, with some additional planning, it should be possible to divide the ACOC responsibilities so that each sector is primary backup for certain operations and secondary backup for others. Then, depending upon the scenario and actual causes of control center failures, distribution of control and management functions can be assigned by the DCA operations center. It should be noted that use of the sectors is but one of a number of possible alternatives for enhancing the survivability of DCS system control.
The actual implementation of these survivability features is dependent upon detailed planning which capitalizes on the sector level automation through ATEC, as well as relatively modest software modules for the sector to automate system level network control functions. The biggest challenge is the development of the required displays and software for operator interaction so that the control options and commands are readily understood by the operational personnel who are understudying the primary controllers.
VI. CONTROL FOR WORLDWIDE VOICE NETWORKS
The Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) continues to be the heart of the unclassified communications facilities of the Defense Department, and will become the primary vehicle for the improved Secure Voice System of DoD. Since largescale replacement of the existing AUTOVON assets, through the evolution to the Defense Switched Network (DSN), is still in the process of engineering design and definition, it is prudent to look toward improving communications control capabilities to help ensure the continued usefulness of the AUTOVON. The AUTOVON, based largely on first generation electronic four-wire switches, is controlled and maintained from localized control facilities at each switch site. Various facilities enable the health and status indications of the switches to be remoted to the area control center for traffic and network control functions. The AUTOVON Centralized Alarm System (ACAS) together with the AUTOVON Traffic Data Collection System (TDCS) permit the centralization of control and monitoring of AUTOVON. However, with application of local processing and control at the switches, substantial improvements could be obtained in the overall control capabilities. Key factors in this improvement are the .obsolescence of the electromechanical trouble punch for.switch fault detection and the availability of ATEC derived nodal processor capabilities at or near the AUTOVON switches,
The switches as presently implemented make localized health and status assessments on themselves for hardware, software, interface, and traffic-related characteristics. This same information, fed to a processor-controlled interface and translation device, makes these data useful to the switch controllers and operators by reducing them and converting them directly to readable faults and parameters. This capability, known as the Rapid Access Maintenance Monitor ( R A " ) , will soon be operational at every overseas AUTOVON site. By combining these data with ACAS and TDCS data at the ATEC nodal processor, and by correlation of transmission faults with switch-detected problems, substantial improvements in fault isolation and trouble anticipation can be attained. The, overall accuracy and quality of these data, as available to the controllers at the various levels of the system control hierarchy, will be grossly better since this information would be available from and transmitted via the ATEC system at the lower levels. These data also provide a better basis at the sector and area control levels for making network and traffic control decisions, such as for the implementation of line load control, trunk directionalization, and routing control. The decision to implement restoral plans in case of switch failures, and the ability to make the required changes to the switch software at the network control level can similarly be derived through the interface to the nodal level processors.
VII. SYSTEM CONTROL FOR NEW GENERATION DCS SYSTEMS
The evolutionary digitization of the entire DCS, together with the ongoing AUTODIN I1 and Real-Time Adaptive Control (RTAC) System for the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), offers a unique opportunity to provide a high level of system control involvement early in the system conceptual design. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide detail on the controls of each individual DCS subsystem, the control of the massive Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) provides a unique example which will be elaborated on further in Section VIII. In general, it is important to realize that the modern digitai subsystems have a greater inherent capability to provide performance and status data to the controllers, and to respond to either automated or manually entered control commands. These capabilities will be fully'exploited in the overall system control capabdities, following the principle that the equipment and maintenance control information, will interface at the station level, generally through the ATEC alarm inputs or by direct processor channel inputs to the nodal control system. Overall subsystem control on a traffic or network basis will continue to be provided from the theater level control, with sector backup of critical functions.
VIII. REALTIME ADAPTIVE CONTROL (RTAC) FOR THE DEFENSE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (DSCS)
The control of the Defense Satellite Communications System has several unique features and demands placed upon it. For this reason, the control structure has historically grown along specialized capabilities, rather than under the distributed, integrated control structure described in the previous sections. However, with the deployment of the DSCS 111 Satellites, and the development of the Real-Time Adaptive Control System (RTACS), control of satellite communications will become closely aligned and integrated with the control of other remaining assets of the DCS.
: ? , . Before describing the RTACS and RTACS-to-terrestrial control interfaces, it is important to highlight the fact that the Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS) is a U.S. Department of Defense resource which serves many users. Only about one third of total DSCS capacity is used to support typical long haul, strategic voice and data communications which are part of the common user DCS. The remaining DSCs capacity serves a myriad of "special" users and "special" ded!cated subnetworks, such as Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, support to tactical Ground Mobile Forces (GMF) and wide-band (multimegabit) point-to-point data systems (Fig. 7) . Control of the satellite communications resources, including the satellite payload, the accessing earth stations, as well as communications network control, has been concentrated at a few satellite control sites. The RTACS capabilities will fully integrate satellite, earth station, and network control into a single structure, with direct control and management responsibility to the appropriate levels of the DCS control structure.
Further, DSCS requirements for control of Satellite transmission facilities differ significantly from commercial equivalents in that unpredictable changes in traffic requirements must be implemented rapidly and reliably, and essential connectivity must be maintained at maximum supportable data rates under jamming conditions. In addition, DSCS must accommodate a wide variety of terminal sizes and dynamically changing terminal deployment. To meet these changing requirements, the control system must support changes in network operation with a response time consistent with the rate of change of demands placed on DSCS. To provide DSCS with real-time adaptive control, the control configuration shown in Fig. 8 , has been developed for the'DSCS control segment. In order to meet this need, real-time control provides critical services in support of DSCS transmission functions, including: 1) rapid response to link establishment and reconfiguration requests from both DCS and non-DCS users under direction of the DCS Control facilities and control centers; 2 ) maintenance of acceptable transmission quality on all satellite links; 3) fulltime monitoring, measurement, and analysis of all communications signals radiated by each satellite; 4) full-time satellite telemetry and command support for payload control, malfunction detection, and reconfiguration; 5) full-time monitoring and control of all Earth terminals for malfunction detection, and network reconfiguration; 6 ) recognition and response to jamming; 7) minimization of the effect of control system failures on transmission system performance; 8) detection and correction of user allocation violations; and 9) data collection and reporting for support of trend analysis and resource management.
As is the case for control of terrestrial assets, real-time control of DSCS resources substantially improves the survivability, availability, and capacity of DSCS. A marked reduction in susceptibility to jamming is achieved through fast, accurate detection and analysis of a jamming threat when such analysis is combined with positive control of critical resources during transition to a stressed operating mode. Improved availability is achieved by implementation of a pooled margin concept in which a percentage of available power and bandwidth is reserved for dynamic contingency support or propagation anomalies in lieu of static margin allocation. Improved capacity is achieved through reduction in margin requirements, and through introduction of dynamic services tailored to fit the demands of differend classes of user traffic.
Under RTACS operation, the DCA Worldwide and Theatre Operations Centers assume full operational control of all DSCS satellite networks. The SATCOM network and spacecraft control funct:ions are accomplished at Network Control Facilities (NCF) installed adjacent to certain host earth terminals. The NCF includes the Network Control Element (NCE) which is the core of RTACS. The NCF's exercise dayto-day operational direction of the DSCS. SATCOM network controllers are responsible for network operations and performance on a continuous basis. They are assisted by satellite controllers who mfonitor the DSCS 111 satellites and control the on-board communications payload configuration. The DSCS I11 satellites have X-band telemetry and control so that control of the communications payload can be exercised through the DSCS earth stations. In addition, the DSCS 111 satellites are equipped with S-band telemetry and control for use with the Air Eorce S-band control capability for housekeeping functions and for the communications payload, hence providing a backup to the X-band control.
Special users who establish separate networks through the satellite will interface with the NCF via a Subnetwork Control Terminal (SNCT). Each SNCT will control the operation of its network and will be interconnected with the NCF to provide specified status and performance data and receive power and bandwidth allocations.
In order to support the full spectrum of RTACS capability, three types of control elements are required, namely, the Operational Control Element (OCE), Network Control Element (NCE), and Terminal Control Element (TCE). The OCE provides the necessary communication and data processing equipment to directly interface personnel at the DCA Operations Center, the Area Communications Operations Centers, and the Air Force Satellite Control Facility with the network database and operating personnel at the NCF. The specific configuration of each OCE will depend upon the functional and interface requirements of the facility it supports.
The NCE's provide the computational and functional heart of RTACS, consisting of equipments for data processing, signal monitoring, satellite command and telemetry, and control communications necessary to provide overall operational direction of a DSCS satellite network. For survivability purposes, two NCF's will be deployed at geographically separated locations for each of the four DSCS satellite networks to provide alternate control facilities. Six NCF's will be located within U.S. territory, while two NCF's for the Indian Ocean satellite will be located overseas because of a field-of-view limitation. An overview of the NCF deployment is shown in Fig. 9 .
The TCE consists of status collection, power control, data processing, and control communication equipment to effect automatic status collection and reporting, automatic link power control, and local configuration control of 'a DSCS earth terminal. All DSCS fixed, transportable, and mobile terminals worldwide will be equipped with TCE capability. Several generic types of TCE's will exist with capabilities corresponding to the various types of terminals. Each TCE reports to both its immediately superior NCE, as well as to the primary DCS technical control and ATEC Nodal Control which derives connectivity through that particular earth station. Thus, both intentional and unintentional changes in satellite performance and connectivity are monitored simultaneously via the RTACS hierarchy and through the usual transmission media control and monitoring capabilities within ATEC. The physical relationship of these equipments and their interface is shown in Fig. , lo. Node level algorithms correlate data from both sources and fault detection and isolation are materially enhanced, as is the.ability to resolve problems occurring between the major tech controls and the satellite earth terminal equipment.
By combining the RTACS elements with the other control elements and facilities of the DCS, the overall DCS control structure shown in Fig. 11 results. Through this structure, with its multiple reporting paths, a high degree of control flexibility, reliability, survivability, and integration is achieved. However, much work is yet to be done, particularly in the area of control data processing, control algorithm development, and man-machine interface to fully capitalize on all of the capability inherent to this control structure.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In summary, the system control structure of the Worldwide Defense Communications System is embarking on broad, evolutionary modernization and automation.
Numerous improvements w$ be achieved by virtue of the up-
